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                            Introduction
  
A number of complications arise in this particular study of Tolstoy’s War and Peace, that 
“wonderful mass of life” that Henry James described once as a “monster harnessed.”  The 1
first complication comes naturally out of James’s quotation: in what way can a “wonderful 
mass” be broken down, made manageable, how can it, in a word, be “harnessed”? 
I attempt a specific reading of War and Peace which is concerned, on the one hand 
with the book’s style, and on the other, with its content or form. The two terms which occur 
throughout the paper: the “absolute” and the “limited,” reference two contradictory 
authorial modes which Tolstoy switches between. By reading into potential limitations in 
Tolstoy’s “absolute” mode, I go some distance into a reading of the book as “a process, a 
passage” and not, say, the “thing,”   immobile, complete or “absolute” as a work.  2
Perhaps most significant within the paper, however, is the repercussions of this 
“limited” reading. In one letter, Tolstoy writes, regarding War and Peace, that: “people will 
praise the sentimental scene of the young lady. . .and such rubbish, which is on their level,” 
and that “nobody will notice the main thing.”  I cannot be sure that I really understood the 3
“main thing” during this paper. But, at the same time, Tolstoy’s belief that there is a “main 
thing,”  is of great significance in the study of “absolute” and “limited” modes within his 
book. While his expansive theory of history, making up a considerable part of War and Peace, 
might be the most hulking example of Tolstoy’s “absolute,” (maybe also “the main thing” to 
him),  the scenes of the “young woman,” those intricacies and textures of the every-day, 
ordinary human experience, also contain multitudes of “absolute” statements, and are 
textually much more frequent, and much more “main.” What Tolstoy regarded as “rubbish” 
is the grounds for my paper. 
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I have found perhaps the most useful aid in a study of Tolstoy’s limitations through 
Isaiah Berlin’s reading of Archilochus’s “fox” and “hedgehog.”  The “hedgehog,” in Berlin’s 4
representation, is the embodiment of the “absolute” as an idea, not precisely as it is 
manifested in terms of authorial mode, but in close alliance with it. In more precise terms, 
the “hedgehog” understands itself through “a single, universal, organizing principle”; 
Tolstoy’s idea that there is a “main thing” in his book points to this single-minded quality. So 
when Mirsky calls War and Peace a “monument” of “objectivity” he favors this more 
“hedgehog” reading. I favor the “fox” in my study, which moves on “many levels” and 
through “a vast variety of experiences,”  thus belying the need for a definitive end. This leads 5
to the heart of what this paper is all about: a close examination of transient experiences 
throughout Tolstoy’s book. The experiences I study— realized through a number of 
characters—are linked through their multivalence. Instead of opting for the “universal” or 
“absolute,” I emphasize the variousness and subjectivity, understood through limitation, 
which each experience uniquely has to offer. This naturally tends away from a monistic 
interpretation of singularity or oneness, and towards pluralism. 
The ideas of scholars Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly play into this study not 
inconsiderably. Although I turn to them only in the third chapter, the possibility of reading 
War and Peace with a pluralistic eye was realized through my reading of their scholarship. 
Dreyfus and Kelly come as a source from our contemporary, secular moment, in which the 
potential for a “nihilistic existence”  is more apparent than ever. A reading of limitations 6
throughout a narrative characterized by “absolutes” contains elements which, although 
distinct in terms of its historical moment, runs the risk of taking a “nihilistic” turn. Tolstoy 
has been linked to the Russian “netovshchik” or “negativist,” an “early version 
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of. . .nihilism,”  so such a reading is not altogether out of bounds. The potentials of reading 7
subjectivity or limitation in a variety of experiences, ranging from aesthetic moments of 
realization, or “turns”—can be expanded, I hope, beyond the purview of this study. 
The other potential complication, to return to my beginning words, is in the 
relationship between author and artist. Although I have kept closely to the text of War and 
Peace, there are a handful of examples I draw from other works by Tolstoy, some from after 
the publication of War and Peace, during or after what R.F. Christian calls his “so called 
conversion,”  a period in which he was regarded as “pacifist,” “sage of Yasnaya Polyana,” and 8
the Tolstoy who turned “ascetic.”  Any reference to the later period of Tolstoy’s writing 9
serves to move forward and develop ideas within the project. In defense of this, a particular 
decision which might seem out of line, I would argue that ideas of an artist do not function 
linearly; especially in Tolstoy’s case, the thoughts and problems which encompass War and 
Peace were, both in his young and late life, circling.  In a project about limitations in 
“absolute” language and form in Tolstoy’s fiction, including the later writing of that “baffling 
man,” “notorious for his self-contradictions”  is not out of place. In an entry from his diary, 10
dated from March of 1856, ten years before War and Peace was first published, a younger 
Tolstoy writes: “last night I was tormented by sudden doubts about everything. And now, 
though they don’t torment me, they are still with me.”  While it may seem dangerous to 11
link the work of the writer with various periods within his life, the actual issues which 
Tolstoy, both early and late, grappled with most extremely stayed with him, and had to do 
with these “doubts about everything,”   While the specific scope of this project is concerned 
with limitations in “absolute” specifically in War and Peace; the implications of the paper 
correspond, at least to some degree, with far greater issues within this divide. 
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Three characters are principal to my study, and for each I have devoted a chapter. 
Although each chapter deals primarily with its title character: Pierre, Andrei, and Natasha, 
respectively, these three characters each offer specific examples of the limitation in forms of 
the “absolute” through different manifestations of “revelatory” experience, and they are 
closely connected within the narrative of the book as a whole. They also complete a 
triangulation in their personal fates—Natasha is engaged to Andrei, Andrei is killed, 
Natasha marries Pierre. 
The first chapter devotes itself to the two authorial modes which I mentioned 
earlier, and in greater detail. Gary Saul Morson’s term “absolute language” figures into the 
chapter’s structure, and Morson’s influence will maintain significance throughout each 
chapter. Through Pierre’s external and internal descriptions, I attempt to set up the two 
contrary modes, and to complicate these two modes through the language in which they are 
expressed. The first chapter also introduces the concept of pluralism, and makes a case for it 
in Pierre. The second chapter has a similar devotion, but to a radically different end. 
Through Andrei, a different expression of the “absolute” is embodied, one corresponding 
most accurately to monism, and which offers a secular reading. The third chapter presents a 
final and, I would like to think, an alternative to the two possible modes evidenced in the 
two previous chapters—not quite pluralistic, not quite monistic, with the intention of 
presenting what might be another look into the potentials of living directly through 
transient experience.  
Before the first chapter, I have included two poems. They be read as preface, of sorts, 
for the entire paper.
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The Idea 
For us, too, there was a wish to possess
Something beyond the world we knew, beyond 
ourselves,
Beyond our power to imagine, something 
nevertheless
In which we might see ourselves; and this 
desire
Came always in passing, in waning light, and in 
such cold
That ice on the valley’s lakes cracked and 
rolled,
And blowing snow covered what earth we saw,
And scenes from the past, when they surfaced 
again,
Looked not as they had, but ghostly and white
Among false curves and hidden erasures;
And never once did we feel we were close 
Until the night wind said, “Why do this,
Especially now? Go back to the place you 
belong;” 
And there appeared , with its windows 
glowing, small,
In the distance, in the frozen reaches, a cabin;
And we stood before it, amazed at its being 
there, And would have gone forward and 
opened the door,
And stepped into the glow and warmed 
ourselves there,
But that it was ours by not being ours,
And should remain empty. That was the idea.
             
—Mark Strand      
Hedgehog
The snail moves like a
Hovercraft, held up by a
Rubber cushion of itself,
Sharing its secret
With the hedgehog. The 
hedgehog
Shares its secret with no 
one.
We say, Hedgehog, come 
out
Of yourself and we will love 
you.
We mean no harm. We 
want
Only to listen to what
You have to say. We want
Your answers to our 
questions.
The hedgehog gives nothing
Away,  keeping itself to 
itself.
We wonder what a 
hedgehog
Has to hide, why it so 
distrusts.
We forget the god
Under this crown of thorns.
We forget that never again
Will a god trust in the 
world.
—Paul Muldoon
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             Chapter One:  Pierre 
          “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows the one big thing.”           
 
      —Archilochus via Isaiah Berlin12
      
    I
                                        The Absolute vs. Artistic Subjective  in Tolstoy 
In 1868, Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy published an article reflecting on War and Peace. In the brief 
essay, he attempts to systematically define what the great book really is. His desire, he tells 
his readers, is “to direct their attention to what [he] wished to say but owing to the 
conditions of work could not enlarge on.”  Tolstoy also takes time to respond to criticism of 13
his masterpiece, addressing, for instance, his use of both Russian and French throughout the 
book.  He writes that: 
the reproach that in a Russian book people speak and write French is like the 
reproach of a man who, looking at a portrait, notices black spots (shadows) on
it which do not exist in nature. The painter is not to  blame if to some people 
the shadow he has put on the face of the portrait appears as a black spot
nonexistent  in nature, he is only to blame if such shadows are put  
 on wrongly or coarsely.14
Here, Tolstoy argues in favor of the primacy of subjectivity in art, and the need for 
“absolute” truth to be thrown into relief by experience—that, in fact, the singular truth a 
“portrait” captures might not be evidenced in “nature” at all.  That said, for Tolstoy there is 
a “wron[g]” way of going about this; he acknowledges that the subjective approach risks a 
great deal, failure even,  if “such shadows”—the very human, discrete gradations—are not 
rendered in the way of hard, honest precision. Tolstoy’s defense of War and Peace’s 
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bilingualism serves as an excellent conduit into discussing his complicated relationship with 
realism. The previous passage reveals Tolstoy’s approach to be a rather liberal one. Indeed, 
he assiduously avoids laying claim to the mantle of absolute truth, so long as the “shadows” 
cast over his own book are not “put on wrongly or coarsely.”  This standpoint places an 
enormous degree of importance on conditional experience, and—to that end—the great 
Russian author opens his essay by commenting that “no idea is being put forward” in War 
and Peace,  and “nothing is proved.”    15
One might also keep in mind Tolstoy’s letter to one of his contemporaries,  P. D. 
Boborykin, in the year War and Peace was first published. There, he writes: 
the goal of the artist is not to solve a question irrefutably, 
but to force people to love life in all its innumerable,
inexhaustible manifestations16
This quotation may point to a more hopeful way of reading subjectivity in War and Peace, 
complicating the text’s penchant for sweeping and proverbial assessment, or “absolute 
language,”  the term Gary Saul Morson has coined to describe Tolstoy’s statements of truth 17
that flirt with the universal and often occur at seemingly random moments (i.e., the much 
discussed and famous opening of his other masterpiece, Anna Karenina: “All happy families 
are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”). I will discuss the 
implications of Morson’s term more extensively in the second section of the chapter.  
Speaking in terms of the tenuous relationship between “style” and “content,” one 
senses a major contradiction: on the one hand, Tolstoy’s repeated assertions gesture towards 
some sort of singular truth that form a major cut of the book; on the other, the narrative’s 
depiction of life, “in all its innumerable, inexhaustible manifestations,” gestures towards a 
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much more multivalent, even fragmentary, account of the texture of experience.  These two 
authorial positions seem diametrically opposed, of course. And perhaps this is what Henry 
James means when he writes of War and Peace that: “a picture without composition slights its 
most precious chance for beauty. . .there may in its absence be life. . .but what to do with 
such loose baggy monsters?”   18
A case can be made, I would argue, for a more subjective, pluralistic understanding of 
War and Peace, one which goes a not inconsiderable distance towards problematizing 
Morson’s notion of “absolute language.” In order to make this claim, however, I assert that 
the two authorial positions Tolstoy assumes might not neatly accord with the reading that I 
have favored here; and, admittedly, I do not exclude myself from those other words that 
Henry James wrote regarding certain critics’ approach to understanding Tolstoy: “disciples 
not elephantine he can only mislead and betray.”19
        
           II 
                Pierre’s Confusion and the Dissolving of Two Forms
These two apparently oppositional modes—the “absolute” and the “limited” or 
subjective—are perhaps most persuasively expressed in the character of Pierre, where the 
“nonexistent” aspect of artistic depiction is most vibrant and fleshed out. In fact, the first 
thing one notices about him is his name, French of course, and, moreover, it seems a subtle 
joke that Pierre, the illegitimate son of a Count “well-known grandee of Catherine’s time,”  20
is the character most often described as “natural.”   From the first moment the reader 21
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encounters Pierre, it is very clear he is ill-suited to the life in he finds himself living. Look no 
further than his first description, his first utterance: 
Pierre murmured something unintelligible, and continued to look round as if in 
search of something. On his way to the aunt he bowed to the little princess with a 
pleased smile, as if to an intimate acquaintance.22
Pierre’s mumbling, bumbling introduction gives him away immediately; his smile to “the 
little princess” further reveals the unaware tactlessness we come to love. But this scene does 
much more than set up Pierre as a young man ill-suited to high society. In this brief glimpse, 
one senses a towering dilemma forming, one that will reoccur throughout the rest of War 
and Peace. It is in the continual “look” that Pierre surveys his surroundings with that most 
illuminates this problem. The “search” for “something” occupies the young Count Bezhukov 
from this point on. This “something” has no set definition. And it may be in the moment 
that this word—paramount to the entire book—might earn a solid meaning would also be 
the moment of its undoing.
 Pierre moves most fluidly between Tolstoy’s two authorial modes. This is because 
Pierre’s preoccupation—rendered as his externalized unawareness, his physical enormity, 
(always “rather bigger than any other man in the room”), and his “shy, but observant natural 
expression”—is at odds with his inner emotional life, which is sensitively preoccupied with 
broad questions of human existence.  23
In the peculiar split between Pierre’s inner and outer appearance, the issue becomes 
one of divided attention. On the one hand, a reader might pay close heed to Pierre’s external 
or physical descriptions. These appear to correspond with “absolute language.” Take, for 
example, the moment in which Pierre sinks into despair over his situation: 
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 Pierre was one of those people who, in spite of an appearance of what 
 is called weak character, do not seek a confidant in their troubles.
 He digested his sufferings alone.24
The description seems to issue from a position of complete moral authority. Not only is 
Pierre’s character broadened to fit a wide spectrum of possible people like Pierre,  the 
generalization makes a moralizing claim: that people like Pierre, “in spite of what is called 
weak character,” act in a way that closely aligns with his current condition. The sentence 
fuses Pierre’s internal life with his external appearance; he definitely “was one of those 
people.” Yet Tolstoy’s portrayal—although it seems absolute in its definitive characterization
—yields to a significantly more complex vision of the relationship between 
“appearance” (what names itself as the broad “weak character”) and the reality of such a 
character. The implicit moralizing terminus of such a descriptions feels lacking, leaving a 
reader to wonder whether some nuance might exist in the definition of such a “weak 
character.”  Whatever subtlety might reside in the narrow wedge, between what seems-to-be 
and the truth of Pierre’s specific condition, is one of the most perplexing, if not infuriating, 
aspects of Tolstoy’s universalizing use of language. All the reader can be quite sure of comes 
at the conclusion: “he digested his sufferings alone.” Looking Tolstoy’s own words offers the 
most coherent way out of this dilemma, and one must remember that the arc of human life 
can never be boxed into a precise, overwhelming generality, but exist  as “innumerable.” To 
believe the author’s “absolute” statement would be to go against that same author’s own 
words. The reader must be careful, therefore, not to judge immediately, but rather take 
heed. 
Pierre’s internal life is much richer than his universalizing descriptions betray. The 
richness of his character is most stark in moments when he turns over and over, in his own 
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mind, deep unanswerable questions. During these moment, when a statement of “absolute” 
or authoritative truth is suddenly introduced, it seems absurd, and out of place. Moreover, 
when these “absolute” claims appear directly after Pierre has been in the process of deeply 
thinking through something, they do nothing to forward the narrative at all. The difficulty 
in reading Tolstoy’s “absolute language” as a sort of scripture, Morson likens them to be, is 
because, for all his statements of apparently objective truth, “no idea is being put forward” 
at all. Another moment evidences this curious particular within the text: 
“I  understand the deception and confusion,” he thought, “but how am I to tell them all that 
I see? I have tried and have always found that they too in the depths of their souls 
understand it as I do, and only try not to see it. So it appears that it must be so! But I—what 
is to become of me?” thought he. He had the unfortunate capacity many men, especially 
Russians, have of seeing and believing in the possibility of goodness and truth, but of seeing 
the evil and falsehood of life too clearly to be able to take a serious part in it.25
Pierre sees something which he cannot identify, in himself not yet unrealized, but 
attempting to be understood. He still does know “what is to become” of him. There is a 
sudden change of register, from actual “confusion,” to universalizing statement about people 
like Pierre, (especially “Russians”). When one reads the statement itself—concrete or 
authoritative as its style may be—it does not offer much concerning Pierre’s particular 
situation at all. These statements appear, and continue to appear, as a particular kind of 
Tolstoyan cliché, but because they seem to so definitively outline “many men,” the 
“absolute” is complicated; Pierre’s subjective experience is of much more interest.  
When he is immersed in philosophical daydreaming, Pierre appears the most 
unselfconscious and unaware. What formerly might have appeared as absolute becomes 
inverted or distorted. It is during these moments, as I have outlined above, that Tolstoy’s 
authoritative mode is revealed as faulty. Pierre—the character scholars often argue most 
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closely resembles Tolstoy—continually redefines his position within the text. Although the 
structure and cadence of expression appears to come from a position of power, what is 
missing? Namely: broad strokes make little allowance for the nonexistent, for those “black 
spots,” those “shadows,” discrete and unassimilable into the wide breadth of any absolutist’s 
project. Take this other example of Pierre, after he has challenged the young rake Dolokhov, 
whom he believes to be carrying on with his wife. Pierre wins the duel and flees to Saint 
Petersburg from Moscow in a state of despair. As he waits at a station between the two 
cities, his interior life comes into full display: 
Pierre gave no answer, for he neither heard nor saw anything. He had begun to think 
of the last station and was still pondering on the same question—one so important 
that he took no notice of what went on around him. . .Without changing his carless 
attitude, Pierre looked at them over his spectacles unable to understand what they wanted or 
how they could go on living without having solved the problems that so absorbed him. . .no 
matter what he thought about, he always returned to the same questions which he could 
not solve and yet could not cease to ask himself. It was as if the thread of the chief screw 
which held his life together were stripped, so that the screw could not get in or out, but went 
turning uselessly in the same place.26
Tolstoy relates Pierre’s crisis in two ways: first though exterior depiction, his “careless 
attitude” and the same searching “look” with which he surveys his surroundings, that 
appeared in the introduction of his character; following this, Pierre’s internal life becomes  
visible to the reader. Surprisingly, all that appears “careless” in Pierre dissolves when the eye 
turns inwardly. Although he seems unaware as in his look, Pierre’s principle concern is in the 
lives of those around him. He cannot comprehend the possibility that those he sees might 
“go on living without having solved the problems that so absorbed him.” In this thought 
precisely, the particular exists within the purview of the universal. The crux of Pierre’s entire 
character lives in his ability to view the world as is, in “all its innumerable, inexhaustible 
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manifestations,” to even “love” expansively everything that he encounters equally, and still to 
search endlessly for resolution.  
 In this way, Pierre becomes entangled within the universalizing language that claims 
him as a person of “weak character” and stops there, and the multitudinous particular that 
one universal might contain, that continues to turn without any conceivable end. That 
useless “turning” of Pierre’s mind complicates Tolstoy’s authorial voice and renders the 
“absolute language” of the moment inadequate. Whether or not Pierre’s unresolved 
“question” can be answered proves itself as worthless as the pursuit itself.  Indeed, that very 
unknowability is what excites Pierre the most, and most succinctly captures his struggle. 
These universal questions defy Tolstoy’s characteristic “absolute language” because, by 
nature, they precisely deflect any attempts to answer their contradictions. The reader will 
encounter, again and again, moments that evince Pierre’s dilemma, in which it is: “as if the 
thread of the chief screw which held his life together were stripped,” and the “turning” does 
not terminate in any fixed place.  
There are innumerable examples in War and Peace that further confirm the disjointed 
parallel between the absolute and the limited. Gary Saul Morson describes the Tolstoyan 
narrative as that which “does not say; it is a saying. Admitting no authorship, it condescends 
to no dialogue.”  Mikhail Bakhtin, an avid lover of Dostoevsky and equally avid abhorrer of 27
Tolstoy, lurks behind Morson’s claims. Bakhtin’s distinction between the “dialogic,” which 
engages in conversation between separate, subjective voices, finds its foil in the 
“monological”  dimensions Morson points to in his term “absolute language.” Bakhtin 28
identifies Tolstoy’s fictional “world” as one without “a second autonomous voice,”  and 29
Caryl Emerson follows up with the assessment that any “unity” framed as absolute or 
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necessary rings “false because it is one an apparent oneness; in fact, monologism demarcates, 
abstracts, excludes, and it is only from within this closed. . . system that everything can be 
seen.”  Morson harps on Bakhtin’s original idea when he pegs War and Peace as stylistically 30
closer to “Scripture”   than fiction, a statement that comments on Tolstoy’s autonomous 31
voice, leaving room only for “unity” while shunning all that goes against an “apparent 
oneness.”  
While both Morson and Bakhtin make enlightening claims, I might tend away from 
identifying Tolstoy as simply a relayer of absolutes. Turing toTolstoy’s own life, one might 
describe him , at one point, as a “teacher of life.”  But to look only at this singular aspect of 32
“teacher” within Tolstoy—a role that he himself desired more fervently than any other—
would be to forsake that other part of him which was perpetually in the throes of anguish 
and doubt. I might turn to a description of another author which, although it may appear an 
aberration, offers an interesting insight into Tolstoy’s world.  In 1868, Nathaniel Hawthorne 
depicted Herman Melville as a man: 
wandering to-and-fro over these deserts, as dismal and monotonous as the sand hills 
amid which we were sitting. He can neither believe, nor be comfortable in his 
unbelief; and he is too honest and courageous not to try to do one or the other.33
These words, in another context, might be written of Tolstoy, and they highlight problem 
that Morson and Bakhtin overlook in their descriptions of the Russian author’s fictional 
world. This is because Tolstoy, as much as he might have bounded after the comfort of 
absolute truths, could “neither believe nor comfortable in his unbelief.” The many halts and 
“crises” that arise throughout War and Peace, although they may contain fragmentary 
moments of “absolute language,”  do not mark the book as an emblem of “oneness” or the 
 16
perfected “organic process” that Emerson and Bakhtin both see in Tolstoy. The screw does 
not cease “turning,” and, however scriptural Tolstoy’s authorial style might be, the crises 
that continually trouble characters like Pierre disclose knowledge’s limitations.  Take, for 
example, another moment with Pierre, at the same point of crisis after his duel:
“And I” continued Pierre, “shot Dolokhov because I considered myself 
injured, and Louis XVI was executed because they considered him a criminal, 
and a year later they executed those who executed him—also for the same reason. 
What is bad? What is good? What should one love and what hate? What does one 
live for? And what am I? What is life, and what is death? What power governs all? 
There was no answer to all of these questions except one, and that not a logical
 answer and not at all a reply to them. The answer was: “You’ll die and all will end. You’ll die 
and know all,  or cease asking.” But dying was also dreadful.34
In this string of questions, it appears that only one “answer” is available to the young Count  
But this proves “not a logical answer and not at all a reply” to any of the questions Pierre 
asks himself. The moment does not identify any absolute—indeed the effect is quite the 
opposite—and Pierre realizes that no possible answer can be presented until his death, when 
“all will end” and he will “know all” or “cease asking.” This moment almost causes Pierre to 
plunge into despair, but the crisis is brief, and shortly after this spiral he will meet an 
inspirational Freemason and join the Brotherhood.  
   
                III
     The Aesthetic Experience and  Conversion-in-Progess
The oscillation between crisis and revelation often comes successively. Usually the 
crisis comes first, incited by an external event; the character sinks into despair, as we see 
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Pierre thrash in the throes of despair at the station. The turn—at which point the crisis 
transforms to realization—also relies on the stimulus of an external or aesthetic experience. 
The great distinction between crisis and realization manifests almost exclusively in this way. 
If these oscillating moments occurred less frequently, perhaps, the reader might deign to 
believe that they could be significant conversion points in the lives of Tolstoy’s characters. 
But these turns crop up everywhere. Turgenev criticized War and Peace because of these 
insistent shiftings, condemning them as “vacillations of one and the same emotion, or state, 
placed so relentlessly by Tolstoy. . .I love, so I say, but actually I hate, and so on.”  Turgenev 35
does have a point—the same issues that plague Pierre plague other characters in a similar 
way.  The aesthetically charged realizations that pervade War and Peace can be interpreted in 
their instant as true revelation, and those characters involved feel them intensely as such.  
The “vacillations”  throughout the narrative could be chalked up to the search for a singular 
meaning, as Turgenev believes, but these experiences vary. They occur spontaneously in a 
manifold of characters and vanish as soon as they are taken up. The many crises led by these 
rapid shifts of mood offer one example of the incompleteness and plurality of revelation, 
and the rejection of a singular “truth.”   The experience of “crisis” for Pierre most often 
manifests in his internal confrontation with the hard questions of human meaning. But 
moments of realization do not always occur in this way. Often, the experience slips in, 
incited by an everyday event. 
Take the example of Rostov, a young count who does not wander too far into the
deeper quandaries that trip up and agonize a character like Pierre. He has lost 43,000 rubles
in a foolish bet, and faces the guilt of asking his father, the older Count Rostov, for money—
his father has already given him an allowance and told him he must be “economic this
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time.”  At the height of his guilt, Rostov falls into a sudden, unexpected joyful mood as he 36
hears his sister, Natasha, singing.
 How moved was something that was finest in Rostov’s soul! And this something
was apart from everything else in the world and above everything else in ! !
the world. “What were losses, and Dolokhov, and words of honor? All nonsense!
One might kill and rob and be happy... 37
This mood quickly passes from Rostov, as soon as Natasha ceases singing. But the moment
accomplishes two interesting things. It first reveals the presence of something universal,
“finest in Rostov’s soul, while at the same time “above everything else in the world.” This
suggests that to find what is most precious in the soul transcends all that might exist in the
world, while it remains specifically present only in the soul of one particular, in this case
somewhat peripheral character. But the feeling is transient, and soon vanishes—it is nothing
but a feeling that moves Rostov to this revery, prompted by the voice of an external figure. 
It “vibrates” a “chord” both in the real, physical sense and moves toward the ephemeral, 
“above the world.” The effect is a division, or splitting of realities, at the very least. The
extraordinary can be found only in the ordinary, for Tolstoy.  The ellipses as conclusion is a 
favorite move for Tolstoy, precisely because its effect does not conclude anything. By 
lengthening the final moment, the possibility for a contradiction is always present: “one 
might kill and rob and be happy...” The sentence  lingers, suggesting that a turn might be 
revealed as it trails off…  
By leaving Rostov’s momentary revery unresolved, the emphasis is placed on the 
process though through which the experience is understood. In this case, a brief lapse 
incites no self-awareness; he simply hears, is moved, and returns to life.  
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But sometimes there might be a gleam of awareness, even in the moments leading up 
to and within the realization, an awareness that the experience is powerful only because of 
the conditions surrounding it. This is the case in Pierre when he meets the Mason, Bazdeev, 
after the crisis I outlined previously concerning his adulterous wife.  Although Pierre 
remains a Freemason for some time after his initial encounter with the Mason, the reason 
for his “conversion” is the source of some skepticism even as it is occurring. 
Pierre listened with a swelling heart, gazing into the Mason’s face with shining eyes, 
not interrupting him or questioning him, but believing with his whole soul that the 
stranger said. Whether he accepted the wise reasoning contained in the Mason’s 
words; or believed as a child believes, in the speaker’s tone of conviction and 
earnestness; or the tremor of the speaker’s voice—which sometimes almost broke—
or those brilliant aged eyes grown old in this conviction. . .at any rate, Pierre longed 
in his whole soul to believe and he did believe, and felt a joyful sense of comfort, 
regeneration, and return to life.38
Because of the multiple conditions of Pierre’s “believing,” it is apparent that Pierre simply 
believes because he “longed in his whole soul to believe.” There is even a glimmer of 
awareness within Pierre, perhaps, in his acknowledgment of a fervent desire for 
confirmation and meaning in a life that, only a little prior to this moment, was filled with 
unanswerable questions. Morson points out that Tolstoy’s fictional world is filled with the 
“implicit ‘for instance’ ” that creates an impression of conditionality which is often really 
“close to explicit.”  The passage I have provided functions in a slightly different way: 39
instead of the conditional “for instance,” the reader is faced with a host of possible 
motivations for Pierre’s reaction. The reader is not left with a good answer as to which 
motive impels Pierre, and this is precisely the move that Tolstoy makes throughout. The 
reader implicitly recognizes that Pierre feels “joyful” because this is what he wishes for and 
needs and because he sees in the Mason a man whose “conviction” suggests an alternate way 
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of living. Pierre is able to “return to life” anew once he sees his own position from an 
alternate vantage point. The changing of perspective is of utmost importance specifically for 
Pierre. Although he cannot settle on one singular perspective or “answer,” he remains open 
to the multiplicity of all possible experiences. Because of this, Pierre appears as the 
character who most rejects an “absolute.”  
The major distinction between Pierre and Rostov does not reside in the feeling of 
revery—in this way Turgenev is correct in his assessment of sameness within the various 
“oscillations and vacillations” of experience. But in Pierre, the transience of these moods is 
tinged with self-awareness. This does not lessen the moment itself, but allows for the 
possibility that, despite Pierre’s constant attempts to find a solid, absolute truth in his life, 
this does not overwhelm his more intense desire for an alternative perspective. The 
“absolute” can, in Pierre, be seen as in a pluralized sense because of this. And in no other 
character do these two positions exist in such harmony. 
           IV
            Monism and Pluralism Through Pierre 
For the last possible reading of Pierre’s relationship with the absolute and the limited, I 
might introduce two other terms. These may be found in Isaiah Berlin’s study of Tolstoy, and 
identified as “monism,” which sides with Morson's notion of “absolute language,” and the 
belief in an overwhelming unity.  The opposite pole on this spectrum is “pluralism,” which 
survives through multiplicity and, naturally, disunity. Although the use of “absolute language” 
does not necessarily line up in complete harmony with “monism,” the two terms function 
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well in a discussion of Tolstoy’s fictional life. Berlin’s definitions of “monism” and “pluralism” 
might be helpful in moving forward. 
For there exists a great chasm between those, on the one side, who relate everything 
to a single central vision, one system . . .in terms in which they understand, think and feel—a 
single universal organizing principle in terms of which alone all that they are and say has 
significance—40
Before moving on, one can see a certain likemindedness to Morson. Turgenev too would 
agree that the Tolstoyan lives function in a “single universal organizing principle” which does 
not entertain the possibility of variousness or alternate perspectives. If a reader believes, as 
Bakhtin did, that Tolstoy’s characters offer only the singular truth Tolstoy himself places in 
their mouths, this first definition would be perfectly suitable. Morson’s “absolute language” 
lives here, alongside that manifestation of Tolstoy as “teacher of life.” But Berlin goes on: 
 on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even 
contradictory, connected, if at all, in some de facto way. . .these last lead lives, 
perform acts, and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather than centripetal, their thought is 
scattered or diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the essence of a vast variety of 
experiences and objects for what they are in themselves, without, consciously or 
unconsciously, seeking to fit them into, or exclude them from, any one unchanging, all 
embracing, sometimes self-contradictory and incomplete, at times fanatical, unitary inner 
vision.  41
Initially, the characters in War and Peace appear to fit into the first unitary and “centripetal”  
system with more ease than this “centrifugal” one. But, as we see in Pierre, the inclination or 
desire to settle on a “single central vision” takes on far more intensity than the unified 
system. Pierre listens to Bazdeev hoping to move closer toward the heart of something 
which he does not understand. In effect, by continually searching for what Berlin calls the 
“one big thing,”  Pierre immerses himself completely in “a vast variety of experiences.” 42
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Each time Pierre finds himself in a situation which he believes—believes in his whole soul—
will be the answer to his continual uncertainty, he is turned away. Pierre most accurately fits 
into this second category, not because he does not desire to find that “inner vision” but 
because he has the ability to place himself in the multiplicity of experience. He cannot be 
persuaded in full to accept that “incomplete, at times fanatical” system that allows only for 
the absolute, for the unreconcilable. 
 Berlin is quick to notice this discrepancy in Tolstoy. “When we come to Count Lev 
Nikolaevich Tolstoy” he writes, “and ask this of him—ask whether. . . he is a monist or a 
pluralist, whether his vision is of one or of many. . .there is no clear or immediate answer.”  43
This leads back to the issue that I have mapped out in Pierre’s external and internal 
conditions, a chart which leads in two divergent directions. While appearing unaware, 
Pierre’s interior is in fact brimming with far too much awareness, and while searching for an 
absolute, Pierre finds immerses himself in a multiplicity of possible absolute, etc. Although 
it appears that Berlin is correct to state that no “immediate” response can be found to 
reconcile these two parts of Tolstoy, Pierre, at least, favors “many ends”  rather than “one 
unchanging.” His journey straddles both, but his actual stance falls to the side in which 
action is involved with action itself. 
Perhaps the best example of Pierre’s pluralized position occurs when he sees the 
comet of 1812 pass across the sky. His reaction to the event is preceded by an encounter with 
Natasha, the most significant female character in the book. Natasha, who will be discussed 
extensively in the third chapter, often prompts momentary halts within the narrative, as 
noted previously with her brother, Rostov. After Pierre parts from Natasha, Pierre has 
already been primed for the experience he is about to have. Despite his passion for Natasha, 
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Pierre’s moment with her leaves him in a state bordering on crisis, in which his reality 
appears to him ugly in comparison to his previous rapture. 
At the entrance to the Arbat Square an immense expanse of dark starry sky 
presented itself to his eyes. Almost in the center of it, above the Prechistenka Boulevard, 
surrounded and sprinkled on all sides by stars but distinguished from them all by its nearness 
to the earth, its white light, and its long uplifted tail, shone the enormous and brilliant comet 
of 18l2— the comet which was said to portend all kinds of woes and the end of the world. In 
Pierre, however, that comet with its long luminous tail aroused no feeling of fear. On the 
contrary he gazed joyfully, his eyes moist with tears, at this bright comet which, 
having traveled in its orbit with inconceivable velocity through immeasurable   
 space,  seemed suddenly- like an arrow piercing the earth- to remain fixed in a   
 chosen spot, vigorously holding its tail erect, shining and displaying its white light 
 amid countless other scintillating stars. It seemed to Pierre that this comet fully 
responded to what was passing in his own softened and uplifted soul, now blossoming into a 
new life.  (my emphasis)44
It seems that Pierre’s response to the comet is situated wholly in his own individualized 
experience. Although the event “was sad to portend all kinds of woes and the end of the 
world” in a collective sense, the personal experience surpasses and forgets this collective 
sensibility. Much could be said concerning Pierre’s reaction; for my purposes I am most 
interested in the final moment of the experience—which I have bolded—when Pierre’s 
situation finds parallel in the comet itself. On the one hand, Pierre feels a singular 
connection in the “fixed” “spot” that the comet appears to occupy. It seems that, for an 
instant, the “bright comet” has one specific place in the sky. But this is far from the truth. 
On the contrary,  Pierre is moved by the “immeasurable space” through which that comet 
has travelled. Although it appears to occupy a “fixed” position, the significance of the 
experience relies on the inconceivable movement of the comet. Those “countless other 
scintillating stars,” surviving alongside the singular one, do not discount the particular 
comet’s significance. But in pairing the one with the many, without any logical cause in 
doing so, it is possible for Pierre to witness both sides, and revel in the multiple that might 
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exist alongside the singular. Pierre is allowed this moment precisely because of this 
multiplicity. He cannot see singular unity, but he can feel intensely his own experience, 
knowing all along that his particular experience exists “amid countless other scintillating 
stars.” By understanding that the impossibility of remaining “fixed in a chosen spot,” Pierre 
can fully appreciate his own position as the same as the “other.” Instead of moving inward, 
Pierre expands outwardly, and thrives only when he allows himself some form of acceptance.
Pierre, though, does not always accept this position. He does not complete any full 
turn, even by the end of War and Peace.  The peace that Pierre does find by the end 45
functions through seeing that “everything…  was worthy of being loved.”  The flexibility 46
that I have attempted to outline in Pierre makes more sense when related to an equally 
flexible system, one corresponding to the “innumerable and inexhaustible” rather than the 
absolute.
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             Chapter Two: Prince Andrei      
             “Vanity of Vanities, says the preacher, vanity of vanities! All is vanity.”  
   —-Ecclesiastes I,  L. 2. 
         I 
            Prince Andrei as a Possible “Hedgehog”
While a character like Pierre presents an ideal example of flexibility and pluralism, another 
character invites an alternate reading of the relationship between the limited and the 
absolute. This is Prince Andrei Bolkonski, a possible foil to Pierre. Andrei possesses all that 
Pierre lacks, he is: “handsome,” “measured,” well-mannered and decorous.  While a 47
character like Pierre appears unaware and ungainly in society in an unconscious manner, 
Andrei actively loathes this society.  While Pierre relates to his surroundings in a “natural” 
way—and this often gets him into trouble—Andrei’s affected and ironic persona illustrates 
his antipathy towards the society and its artificiality; he is, in a word, “unnatural.” The initial 
description of Andrei, like Pierre, presents a major element in his character which will 
follow him for the rest of the book. 
 Everything about [Andrei], from his weary, bored expression to his quiet, measured          
step, offered a most striking contrast to his lively wife. It was evident that he not only 
 knew everyone in the drawing room, but he found them to be so tiresome that it 
wearied him to look or listen to them.48
So, in Andrei we find a man who is “weary,” “bored,” with the life of the “drawing room.” 
While Pierre is often unaware of his environment, it is also clear that the lives of others 
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concern him deeply. In Andrei, not only is he unaware  he is actively so. The qualities these 
two characters have in common complicates matters.  Again, the reader sees Tolstoy in the 
act of writing an absolute when Andrei’s motivations are, apparently,  unmasked: “it was 
evident that he not only knew everyone. . .he found them so tiresome that it wearied him.”  
Remembering the first moments with Pierre’s searching “look” might be helpful in reading 
the look with which Andrei surveys in this scene. This moment tells much concerning 
Andrei. Unlike Pierre, Prince Bolkonski does not passively wander “to-and-fro,” absorbing 
and turning over in his mind all that he comes across. Rather he must shed his indifference 
before he can undergo a dramatic turn. Usually this occurs to Andrei during intensely 
stimulating periods—while in battle, for example, many of his experiences resemble Pierre’s 
pluralistic turn. 
The major difference between the characters has everything to do with Andrei’s 
relation to the self. Pierre’s impulse towards the plural is, at the core, relative, a sort of 
radical openness utterly irreconcilable with Prince Andrei, who he can view himself 
exclusively in relation to the other, centrifugally. Andrei cannot fully appreciate the fondness 
for the pluralistic, which, for Pierre, offers a kind of comfort. In every place that Andrei 
finds something certain, something absolute, Pierre brushes up against a barrier. This 
determines Andrei’s fate, and dooms his character to death. 
“Andrew Bolkonsky  is nobody. . .” Tolstoy writes, in a letter to L.I. Volkonskaya in 49
1865, while at work on War and Peace. Again, six months later he reiterates himself in another 
letter: “I don’t like Prince Andrew.”   Of all principal characters in War and Peace, it seems 50
that Tolstoy struggled most with the younger Bolkonski. Although, of course, one must take 
the musings of an author deep in the of writing process with a grain of salt, there is surely 
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something quite fascinating about the quote; it offers a kind of voyeuristic look into how 
Tolstoy thought of Andrei’s character, just as he was developing him—yes, “a nobody.” The 
negative term is essential to Andrei, who continually faces crises that culminate in a 
nihilistic realization that “all is vanity,” that there is “nothing” for him in a world of 
“falsehood.”  These moments are of paramount significance, and I will return to them in 51
the third section of the chapter. Tolstoy also tells his readers that he intended to kill of the 
Prince: “I needed a brilliant young man to be killed,” but he soon realized that the young 
aristocrat would be useful to him later. “He caught my interest. . . and I took mercy on him, 
only wounding him severely instead of killing him.”   52
Tolstoy’s apparently personal animus towards Andrei is interesting because, it turns 
out, the Prince’s actions are underpinned by a monistic, single-minded, even absolutist way 
of thinking. As a necessary foil, Piece succeeds when he can sense and understand a pattern 
inherent to the world—an order, hidden, which gives meaning to an otherwise chaotic 
otherness; simply put: Pierre is most comfortable when, as Morson notes, “there are no 
choices to be made.” Andrei is most at ease when he can seize the initiative and, by 
extension, “maximize choice and action.”  In this reading, Pierre, it seems, might even favor 53
the absolute, unified system, which of course contains obvious similarities to Morson and 
Bakhtin’s assessment of Tolstoy’s style and language. Taking into account Pierre’s capacity 
for pluralism, however, it would appear that it is Andrei, in fact, who evidences more 
singular unity, at least within his character. 
Pithily put: Pierre flourishes amidst indecision, Andrei flounders. This contrast, I 
argue, distinguishes Andrei as a character who’s brand of personal monism eventually 
portends his downfall. The major issue in this reading is borne out in this very distinction, 
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which concerns the tension between the limited and the absolute, the monistic and 
pluralistic—and if Andrei’s approach to life does in fact corresponded to a “monological” 
one, it is of an ultimately failing sort. This might be due to Andrei’s inability to relate his 
unified experience to his exterior world, thus continually devolving into investigation of the 
self. But, in light of this, it is interesting to observe that Tolstoy perhaps accidentally placed 
Andrei’s foil in a position of pluralism. Andrei finds, in his in his most intense experiences, a 
connection that is unfailingly personal. This relates to his desire to exercise “free will” and 
play an “active” role in his interactions with the exterior world. To understand Andrei’s 
situation, and why his private monism presents an issue in the relationship between the 
absolute and the limited within War and Peace, it will be necessary to address Tolstoy’s own 
fractious theory of history, which serves as a great example of the disjunction between 
Pierre’s pluralistic, subjective and turning vision—a disjunction I plan to address in greater 
detail later.  
Through Andrei, the limitation of experience can be seen through the self, in a way 
in which a reader cannot find in Pierre; that limitation itself resides in Andrei’s inability to 
engage in a search for meaning, in which he is not fixed, the center of the circle. The 
hopeless conclusion echoes that famous formulation in Ecclesiastes: “vanity of vanity, all is 
vanity. . .all things are full of weariness, man cannot utter it.”  This statement Andrei’s 54
mantra of sorts, and this reliance—a reliance which is absolute for the Prince—precludes 
the possibility of comprehending a meaningful existence. 
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              II
          Implausibility of Pluralism in Andrei and His Contempt 
Although Andrei’s movements seemingly coincide with a more unified system, his problems 
spring around that very way of relating to the ambiguities of a world defined by chaos and an 
impenetrable order. This manifests itself clearly in his attitudes toward society. Unlike 
Pierre, Andrei can function in perfect harmony with the system; he has mastered it, but his 
disregard for the functioning “mill” of social events reveals that, although he may 
understand the minutiae of the sitting room, he feels nothing but contempt for everyone in 
it. The contempt that the Prince feels does not totally rise above self-loathing. But because 
he is himself aware of the inadequacy and insipidness of society life, the majority of Andrei’s 
spite never results in self-reflection. He feels above his own situation, thereby distancing the 
flawed external world from himself. So when Pierre asks his friend why he has chosen to join 
the army, the Prince replies:  
‘What for? I don’t know. I must. Besides that I am going. . .
I am going because the life I am leading does not suit me!”  55
Andrei finds the “life” he is currently “leading” unsuitable. Although he participates in this 
kind of society, he repeatedly refuses to admit that it is his own life which “does not suit” 
him, but rather the set system; he regards that as, at root, faulty, something which exists 
entirely separately from himself.  
When Andrei departs society to go to war, his predictably finds the soldierly life 
much more suitable—not an altogether bewildering development, considering, as we have 
established, he favors choice and action over the philosophical rumination and indecision of 
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Pierre. After he has left Saint Petersburg, Andrei’s entire “expression” undergoes revision. 
He “has no time to think of the impression he makes on others,” and his indolent and weary 
gaze is replaced: “his face expressed satisfaction with himself and those around him.”  The 56
rigid world of the war paradoxically offers him agency, the hope for glory. Despite this 
hopeful development, the very system undergirding the way of being in the army 
consistently dismays him. He feels again and again the inadequacy of those around him. His 
judgmental gaze, however, never returns to himself. For Andrei, singular, self-involved 
perfection involves an idealized view of honor, which might be construed as the ambitious 
“careerist,” as Patrica Carden notes.  But Andrei’s major concern can be located in his 57
disappointment and disenchantment with a system which consistently lets him down, a 
system made-up of people who are passive participants. His disillusionment is “prompted by 
an activity he has previously respected is nothing but a performance,”  as Morson correctly 58
notices. This disenchantment undergoes various mutations, and leads only by degrees to 
Andrei’s eventual loss of faith, not only in a variety of systems, but in life itself. 
After a meeting with the council of war, Andrei’s dissatisfaction, finally, folds 
inwardly. 
The council of war, at which Prince Andrew had not been able to express his opinion as he 
had hoped to, left on him a vague and uneasy impression. . . “But was it really not possible 
for Kutuzov to state his views plainly to the Emperor? Is it possible that on account of court 
and personal considerations tens of thousands of lives, and my life, my life,” he thought, 
“must be risked?” . . .“Yes it is very likely that I shall be killed tomorrow,” he thought . . .    
“Yes, tomorrow, tomorrow!” he thought. “Tomorrow everything may be over for me! All 
these memories will be no more, none of them will have a meaning for me. Tomorrow 
perhaps, even certainly, I have a presentiment that for the first time I shall have to show all I 
can do.”59
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Andrei views the council’s inability to “state” “views plainly” as a structural issue, one which 
carries with it grave consequences for the soldiers who are exposed to the peril of its very 
human whims. Still, Andrei’s animated uneasiness is not entirely selfless; he is concerned 
with his own fate, the only vessel of action that deeply interests him. Because of this, 
Andrei's thinking wanders from the external multiplicity (those "tens of thousands of lives”) 
directly to his own life, "my life," which is emphasized. "Tomorrow, tomorrow!" Andrei 
thinks. While Pierre sees his fellow man curiously, wondering where in the world a perfect 
and "worthy sphere of activity"  might be, Andrei clearly cannot direct his attention toward 60
an ideal beyond himself. When Prince Andrei falls into reveries, they occur linearly; 
"tomorrow everything might be over" leaves open the possibility for direct action.  
Although Andrei's attention during this particular scene is focused on the possibility of 
heroic action, which effectively turns his mind away from terror "tomorrow" might bring, 
another side of the young Prince Bolkonski is revealed in the process: 
“But death and suffering?” suggested another voice. Prince Andrei, however, did not answer 
that voice and went on dreaming of his triumphs. . . The next battle is won by him alone. 
Kutuzov is removed and he is appointed . . . “Well and then?” asked the other voice. “If 
before that you are not ten times wounded, killed, or betrayed, well. . . what then? . . .” “Well 
then,” Prince Andrei answered himself, “I don't know what will happen and 
don’t want to know, and can’t, but if I want this—want glory, want to be known to 
men, want to be loved by them, it is not my fault that I want it and want 
nothing but that and live only for that. Yes, for that alone! I shall never tell anyone, but, oh 
God! What am I to do if I love nothing but fame and men’s esteem? Death, 
wounds, the loss of family—I fear nothing.”61
The other "voice" in this moment will continue to surface. Andrei's doubt is dangerous, 
alternating between personal ambition which is part and parcel with a set, codified system, 
and the reality that every system he encounters fails to appeal to him. Andrei vows to keep 
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his own motivating impulse—that possibility that he loves "nothing but fame and men's 
esteem”—a secret. The voice in Andrei, which returns to the portentous prospect of “death 
and suffering” leads him to a hopeless question: “Well, and then?” Aylmer Maude notices a 
clear relationship between this exact doubt—doubt which foreshadows both Andrei’s 
despair over the all-permeating vanity in the world, and which leads him to dramatically 
conclude “I fear nothing”—and the doubt that permeated Tolstoy’s later life, outlined in 
Confessions.62
 Andrei’s fearless declaration leads us to two possible readings. One centers on 
soldierly virtue, the sort of mordant brittle realism that serves an officer well. This reading 
comes from that first voice, discussed above, which daydreams of "triumphs." Here, Andrei 
in a literal sense fears "nothing," as no tragedy can touch him in his pursuit of glory and 
virtue. And thus the significance of the absolute in Andrei’s mind is at the forefront; he can 
take only one possible action and it will be of his own design.  Alternately, another reading 
travels in a much bleaker direction: the argument that Andrei’s statement has less to do with 
an absence of fear and everything to do with terror—the terror of fearing “nothing,” of a 
pervading sense of worthlessness that renders the pursuit of any abstract virtue like glory or 
valor meaningless, a terror at fundamental unknowability. “Nothing,” then becomes not a 
subject, but an object, an agony that Andrei possesses, and never chose to. 
These two possibilities are another example of absolute language within the text, 
revealing his complex inner world. While Andrei's obsession with choice and activity are his 
most prominent character-traits, his layered self-monologue reveals for another dimension: 
his surprising, deep doubt, his endless grappling with the impossibility of choice in a world 
defined by meaningless and vanity. Pierre’s flexible outlook, his plural relationship to 
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ambiguity, frees him to travel in any direction on the compass in his search for meaning; 
Andrei seems to realize he may only travel in two, north and south, and on the same road, 
which is to say he may either look outward to the world of drawing rooms and the war 
council, never fully understanding either’s coherence, or turn his gaze inward, ever skeptical 
of both.
              III
                       Reading Andrei's Revelatory Experience as a Secular Turn
Already, in Pierre we can detect an alternate system characterized by flexibility and 
pluralism. Although one might read Pierre's ultimate peace at the end of the book as a kind 
of post-conversion, in which his doubts are assimilated into the domestic sphere, he never 
completely settles into a singular or defined position, but accepted the continued possibility 
for more pluralistic turns.  It might be helpful to remember that, for Pierre, the absence of 63
a fixed monistic system—in which the screw could cease its turning, and the order might be 
unveiled—is not entirely a loss; in fact, the very absence is fruitful, in a way he might never 
understand, in its potential for a kind of radical fragmentation as a form of symmetry.
I might suggest that Andrei embodies a secular monism that Tolstoy was not himself 
altogether aware of.  Andrei's disenchantment is vested in public networks, structured 
outlets of power; the life of the soiree is often described mechanically: "the spindles 
humm[ing] steadily and ceaselessly.”  The Prince’s major ambition is for an end, an end 64
which seems endlessly elusive, and at first he appears to find joy at the possibility of 
"rejoicing at the successes and grieving at the misfortunes" of a "common cause."  This 65
possible cause is, for Andrei, brief, and his disposition grows fatalistic and despondent. This 
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is because, I argue, Andrei's principle concern is self-motivated. After his most fundamental 
"turns" he does not look about for others whose experiences might provide some insight, as 
Pierre does.  Instead, he relates the varieties of his most intense experiences to himself 
alone. Patricia Carden defines the distinction between Pierre and Andrei through the 
significance of their respective “inner” and “outer”  lives, and I favor her position. Pierre 66
blunders around, seemingly unaware, hiding a rich and deeply sensitive inner life; Andrei is 
quite the opposite, and relies heavily on the changes he can affect through external 
decisions.  When he has an experience similar to Pierre’s moment with the comet of 1812, 
and sees the “sky” as if for the first time, Andrei loses his faith in the world of appearances 
which he has, for so long, despised. But his revelatory eye wanders, or turns, naturally back 
to himself. While Pierre’s revelry with the comet serves to open up a new possibility of life, 
Andrei’s works to break down his understanding of the world, and plunge him into 
despondency and nihilism. 
What’s this? Am I falling? My legs are giving way,” thought he, and fell on his back. 
He opened his eyes, hoping to see how the struggle of the Frenchman with the 
gunners ended . . . But he saw nothing. Above him there was now nothing but the sky
—the lofty sky, not clear yet still immeasurably lofty, with gray clouds gliding slowly 
across it. “How quiet, how peaceful, and solemn; not at all as I ran. . .how differently 
do those clouds glide across the lofty infinite sky! How was it that I did not see that 
lofty sky before? And how happy I am to have found it at last! Yes, all is vanity, all 
falsehood, except that infinite sky. There is nothing, nothing, but that. But even it 
does not exist, there is nothing but quiet and peace.67
At the moment of Andrei’s revelation he has been struck down—it is this wound Tolstoy 
planned as the Prince’s death. The surprising change of level, from vertical in combat, to 
horizontal, and gazing skyward, confuses him. And, as it turns out, this sudden alienation 
from the active world delivers Andrei anew. He recognizes that “all is vanity, all falsehood.” 
This recognition effects a major turning point in Andrei’s life. One immediately hears the 
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echo of Andrei’s thoughts of “vanity” and the passage from Ecclesiastes:“what does man gain 
by all the toil at which he toils under the sun? A generation goes, and a generation comes, 
but the earth remains forever.”  Choice, activity, all that Andrei champions is undermined 68
when he feels what Charles Taylor calls an experience of “fullness” in the natural world. 
Because Andrei’s character relies on decision-making to find meaning in his life, the 
realization that there is something which surpasses himself is devastating. He suddenly 
believes full-heartedly,  and with the same assurance that the life of society is “all falsehood,” 
that all human life is also worthless in comparison with “that lofty infinite sky” which he 
cannot, and will not, understand. As a result, Andrei loses his faith that the world might 
conceal richness or meaning. In place of meaningfulness, Andrei relishes that “there is 
nothing, nothing,” that even that: “sky” “does not exist.” 
Charles Taylor’s book A Secular Age comes in handy at this point in order to 
understand Andrei’s experience with the “infinite sky.” We have already seen the potentials 
of experience through Pierre’s turns in the last chapter. Taylor identifies possible 
manifestations of these moments, and the conditions preceding the insights. Before 
reaching  Andrei’s specific dilemma, Taylor offers a definition of the positive experience of 
what he terms “fullness.” He writes: 
Somewhere, in some activity or condition, lies a richness; that is, in that place (activity or 
condition), life is fuller, richer, more worth while, more admirable, more what it should be. 
This is perhaps a place of power: we often experience this as deeply moving, as inspiring. 
Perhaps this of fullness is something we just catch glimpses of from afar off; we have the 
powerful intuition of what fullness would be . . . But sometimes there will be moments of 
experienced fullness, of joy and fulfillment, where we find ourselves there.  69
Of course, in Andrei’s experience the potential for “richness” is taken away, unrealized. This 
is not to say that Andrei’s sudden recognition of the sky does not prompt the feeling of 
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“what fullness would be.” Andrei immediately identifies the impossibility of comprehending 
such a “fullness,” and chalks up the experience to a confirmation of the physical world’s vast 
illusory nature. “There is nothing, nothing but that” he thinks. The moment in which Andrei 
feels the experience as “deeply moving, as inspiring” occurs at the same instant of his 
complete and most devastating disenchantment. This is because the experience does reveal 
that “life is fuller,” or “richer,” and certainly not “more worth while.” Although it appears to 
raise Andrei upward, to propel him toward a fundamental truth, in fact the moment 
precipitates a moving downward, backward, out of life. 
No, Andrei’s “experienced fullness” corresponds most accurately in the “negative 
slope” which Taylor connects to the tradition of “damnation,” and of  “exile.” While Pierre 
looks from his internal vantage point outward, Andrei moves from external to internal. 
When he damns the world as illusory, as “nothing,” the possibility of the sacrosanct is all but 
lost for Andrei. One might think of Andrei when Taylor writes: 
The sense of orientation also has its negative slope; where we experience above all a 
distance, an absence, an exile, a seemingly irremediable incapacity ever to reach this 
place; an absence of power; a confusion; or worse, the condition often described in 
the tradition as melancholy, ennui (the “spleen” of Baudelaire). What is terrible in this latter 
condition is that we lose a sense of where the place of fullness is, even what fullness could 
consist in we. . .cannot believe in it anymore 70
So we see Andrei in this second condition of “absence,” hinting at what will prove the 
beginning of his overwhelming unbelief. The possible reason for Andrei’s inability to 
positively orient himself during the experience could be linked to his obsession with agency 
and decision-making, previously noted. Berlin identifies the “single central vision” as 
“centripetal,”  which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as “directed toward the centre 71
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of a circle.”  Andrei continually tends in this direction, and when he recognizes the world’s 72
“vanity” he begins to fold that way. While Pierre recognizes the various  and “scattered” 
parts, and finds peace through gazing up, down, and in every direction he can, Andrei favors 
the system which organizes and remains “coherent or articulate.”  This side aligns with 73
Berlin’s single-minded “hedgehog.” So when Berlin goes on to speculate that “Tolstoy was by 
nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog,” a curious reference might be made regarding 
the difference between Pierre’s potential fox-ness and Andrei’s catastrophic single-minded 
and structured life as a—perhaps selfish— “hedgehog.” 
The evidence of this divide can be seen in the aftermath of Andrei’s first wound, after 
his solemn return to organized life. Leo Tolstoy’s young life was marked by a period of 
“pantheism,” fueled by his readings of Rousseau, the significance of which is not lost in War 
and Peace. Pierre’s “natural” expression is, in one moment, when he wanders into the middle 
of a bloody battle, debased to the point that he is described as a dog. Rousseau’s impression 
is bitterly reflected in Andrei after his return from Austerlitz. Pierre pays a visit to the 
Prince and the two take a walk along the docks. Pierre has recently found a momentary 
peace in the Freemasons, and appeals to his despondent friend. Andrei’s hopeless position is 
revealed for the first time in his conversation with Pierre. In the absurd and slightly comic 
description of Andrei’s conversation with Pierre, the Prince’s “eyes glittered feverishly while 
he tried to prove to Pierre that in his actions there was no desire to do good to his 
neighbor.” Andrei’s explanation follows: 
[the serfs] lead the same animal life, and the stripes on their bodies heal, and they are happy 
as before. But if it is a good thing for proprietors who perish morally, being remorse upon 
themselves, stifle this remorse and grow callous . .. it is those people I pity. . . Conscious of it. 
. . [they] cannot restrain themselves, and grow more miserable. . . So that’s what I'm sorry for
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—human dignity, peace of mind, purity, and not the serfs’ backs and foreheads, which, beat 
and shave, always remain the same backs and foreheads.74
 
So we find Prince Andrei disdaining the intellectual and “miserable” condition he feels 
strongly himself, after he is wounded.  His views on the pursuit of “human dignity”have, at 75
this point at least, been given over to the stronger belief that a meaningful life cannot be 
found through the fruitless actions and choices which present themselves to us. Only 
“animal life,” which asks no questions and hopes for no “truth,” can quell the miserable 
emptiness that Andrei understood on the battlefield. Pierre feels deeply the dangers of 
Andrei’s position, and immediately sees that Andrei has no desire to speak about the “past” 
or the “future,” and no longer desires to make the “plans”  which were once so important to 76
him. Andrei’s new and apathetic view brings about a total shift of focus; away from the 
external world of planning, he effectively isolates himself from the world of order. All 
illusion, he realizes, is an unworthy subject for speculation. This turn will only change in 
Andrei after he experiences an aesthetic moment of “fullness,” embodied in another human 
being, which awakens in him a feeling of universal or “divine” love. This experience is clear 
in Natasha, the character who lives most fully through unthinking mood, and experience. 
Although Andrei’s slow descent into self-involved pessimism progresses through a few 
iterations—most significantly influenced by a recognition of “universal love” when he 
experiences Natasha’s relationship with the external world—life will finally prove unlivable. 
This eventual end point is directly related to his inability to situate himself in an unmeaning 
world; he cannot grasp the “fullness,” which lives in disparate, plural experience.
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           IV
             Limited Absolutes and Andrei's Universal Love 
It may be helpful, especially in the study of Prince Andrei Bolkonski, to briefly 
venture into perhaps the most heavily criticized aspect of the great book: Tolstoy’s 
philosophy of history. The theory itself was, for many years after its publication, the subject 
of scrutiny, even disdain; Turgenev called it “farcical,” Shelgunov named it the “philosophy 
of the swamp.”  77
 The theory is buttressed by the argument that historical truth cannot be understood 
through the examples of “great men,” but relies on the constantly moving “mill” of the 
collective. Andrei particularly is at odds, at first, with this Tolstoyan theory of history.  This 
theory does not rest on an understanding that events take place through the “absolute” 
movements of “great men,” rather that only through continual subjective, and limited 
experiences of ordinary lives does real change take place. Because of this Andrei is most at 
odds with history, both within the book and within himself. This may be because he is the 
only principal character directly motivated by an understanding of  “absolute” and singular 
action. He longs to be remembered for his heroism and cunning in battle, and before his 
wounding at Austerlitz, Napoleon is his greatest hero. These aspects of Andrei’s character go 
against many of the most fundamental pieces of Tolstoy’s idea of historical movement, 
which claims that “historical personages” are not the actual producers of “events.”  Andrei’s 78
life falls apart when he comes to this realization shortly before his tragic demise. The major 
contradiction within Tolstoy’s theory can be seen through the private and public spheres. 
The Prince begins to abhor all public systems, in some sense understanding--or beginning to 
at least, as we see in his conversation on the docks with Pierre--that any vehicle which 
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presumes to hold major power is doomed. This is significant for Andrei because of his 
mastery of the "system," and his continual inward turn which isolates him from the external 
world. 
Berlin comments on the "two systems of value," which most agonize Andrei: on the 
one side: "the public"; on the other the  "private."  Andrei's major issue rests in the "public" 79
sphere; in his personal and "private" experience, one sees the "public" continuing to haunt 
him ("all is vanity"). His negative turn in the Battle of Austerlitz also corrupts his ability to 
be moved by those "feelings and immediate experiences" which prove also nothing "but a 
vast illusion."  80
Andrei only appreciates the "immediate experience" when he can view a moment 
separately from himself. Morson identifies Andrei's "finest moments" as those which "occur 
when language and socially constructed systems of meaning have been transcended."  81
Extending this, it is interesting to note that the experiences which most move Andrei are 
most attuned to the movements of nature, and those which most reject interpretation. The 
great weight of “value," which  distresses Andrei, can be momentarily forgotten only when 
he experiences something transcendent, which he can relate to in private, without 
interpretation. When he witnesses Natasha's astonishment at the moon, for example, 
Andrei is able to find a renewed curiosity in the external world. 
"Do just come and see what a moon!. . .Oh, how lovely!. . .O God, O God, what does it 
mean?” [Natasha] suddenly exclaimed. “To bed then, if it must be!” and she slammed the 
casement. “For her I might as well not exist!” thought Prince Andrei while he listened to her 
voice, for some reason expecting yet fearing that she might say something about him. “There 
she is again! As if it were on purpose,” thought he.82
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Natasha's characteristic abandonment, her flight of fancy, comes as a surprise to Andrei. The 
moment recalls his own skyward meditation, but to a very different end. Indeed, it might 
not be an end at all, rather a single instant of unreasoning wonder, which most excites his 
interests. He cannot help but think that Natasha's actions "were on purpose." But it is 
precisely because of this potential lack that Andrei is freed from his gloom. For the Prince, 
the moment operates on two levels. First, it serves as an immediate glance into the private 
life of another character, for whom he "might as well not exist." At the same time, the 
personal moment is displayed for him without any premeditation. Andrei, perhaps for the 
first time, can experience a potential "fullness" which needs no explanation and offers no 
absolute.  Still, he suspects that Natasha may be performing, or that she "might say 
something about him." Andrei can only be roused from his isolating melancholy through 
experiences which somehow remove him from activity, if only for an instant. 
Natasha opens up the possibility for Andrei to return to life. "No, life is not over for 
me at thirty-one!"  he thinks shortly after he witnesses Natasha’s rhapsody about the moon. 83
But aesthetically motivated reveries like this seldom stir Andrei. More often, even his forays 
into renewed life are undercut by a return to rote routine, which stirs up his buried 
disillusionment. He wishes to live as Natasha does: purely, through experience, and without 
interpretation, but even this proves impossible. When he later professes his love to Natasha, 
all the "poetic and mystic charm of desire" suddenly vanishes, and transforms to "pity."   84
The “mystery," which sometimes may captivate him, cannot be maintained. This may be 
because unlike Pierre, Andrei’s position requires the definitiveness of a cold conclusion.  
This conclusion finally is reached in his death, which Inessa Mejerbosky notes, "proves a 
true illumination.”85
 44
Andrei’s potential for universal love still does not allow him to live, at ease, in the 
world.  This is what Edward Wasiolek points to when he writes that “the one big thing he 
fails to understand is that the universe is not his,” that “life is independent of his beliefs.”  86
Wasiolek reckons this aspect of Andrei’s character proves that he possess no “core,” because 
he expects his personal “wishes, wants and demands” to be met above all else. It cannot be 
denied that this is the case in Andrei. The reason he cannot fulfill his potential as Natasha’s 
husband could be in part because he cannot move away from the singular “self ” as the only 
center available to him. But if one applies  Wasiolek’s reading of the book’s “millions of 
centers,”  to Berlin’s model, Andrei serves the role of the unified being in-and-of-himself. 
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         Living Through Experience 
          Chapter III: Natasha 
Dream delivers us to dream, and there is no end to illusion. Life is a train of moods like a string of 
beads, and as we pass through them, they prove to be many colored lenses which paint the world 
their own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Experience. 87
      I
      Natasha’s “Shareable” Moods and her “Epic” Qualities 
          
The connection between Tolstoy and Homer has, for some time, been the subject of much 
scholarship. In its entirety, War and Peace might even fall under the category of "epic," 
although this point is the subject of much speculation.  But we might ask ourselves, in a 88
study of War and Peace: what makes the book figure into the category of an epic? Percy 
Lubbock called the book “a confusion of two designs,” R.F. Christian wrote of it as “not a 
finished work”; perhaps most notably, Tolstoy himself explicitly tells his readers: War and 
Peace does: “not fit into the form of: novel, epic, or story.”   On the other hand, the vastness 89
of the book, spanning years, multiple families, and wars, figures at the very least into a literal 
definition: War and Peace is without a doubt of “epic” proportions.  Scholars like F. T. 
Griffiths and S. J. Rabinowitz have argued in favor of a reading of War and Peace alongside 
both the Odyssey, and the Iliad. Pierre has even been likened to Odysseus, and Andrei to 
Achilles.  Through the milieu of criticism and scholarships, I would like to offer a reading 90
of War and Peace as a kind of “epic” that hinges on an understanding of epic-ness, not in form 
precisely, but in character. 
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The one character remaining in my study of the book  most clearly embodies this 
“epic” quality.  This is Natasha Rostova. Nicholas Warne writes that Natasha not only: 
"combines the novelistic with the epic, but actually creates a work that resembles a different 
kind of epic."  Her character sweeps between “multilayered individuation” while 91
maintaining  “a maximum of symbolic value.”  Pierre embodies the multilayered: he lives 92
completely within the plural, subjective, and limited experience. So too does Natasha. Andrei 
lives though his individual experience; Natasha too lives in some part lives in this way.. It is 
in Warne’s first characterization of Natasha that I wish to dwell, not in her possible 
“symbolic value” which has linked her character to the “Russian national character” or 
Russian “folk roots.”    Reading Natasha an embodiment of “multilayered individuation,”  93
places her in a position which completes and compliments Pierre and Andrei. She is what 
both Pierre and Andrei sorely wish themselves to be, and can never be: a person who lives 
meaningfully and without doubt.  Because of this, Natasha is not merely Lubbock’s 
identification of the “spirit of youth,”  still less is she the simple “fool”  which Turgenev 94 95
condemns within her character. No, Natasha Rostova embodies that bodily Dionysiac figure 
which Nietzsche described: “piled high with flowers and garlands,” and summoning “the 
ferocious creatures of the cliffs and the deserts” to “peacefully draw near.”  She does not 96
actively reject the structured world, but she lives through and transcends these system 
unconsciously, without feeling contempt for it. Natasha does more than synthesize both 
flesh and the spirit: her presence heralds something  which might be closest aligned to a 
sense of godliness that War and Peace will ever come. She enacts the greatest turns, and 
moves all those around her into the most intense  moments of intoxication. Griffiths 
parallels Natasha with Penelope; I would argue that this is a slightly undeserving 
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correspondence for Natasha, who is more an embodiment of the goddess than Penelope. 
Although she does wait for Andrei after his initial proposal, Natasha is of her own moment. 
This is not to say that she is vastly differs Penelope in her loyalty, more that Natasha’s power 
of commitment exists only in the present, and her feeling, and that encompasses her entire 
way of living in the world. In this way she is most admirable and consistent, both to her 
place within War and Peace and in her position as a character most like that within Homer’s 
epic. 
I suggest first that Natasha’s way of life most fully realizes the potential of living only 
through experience. Unlike Pierre and Andrei, Natasha’s inner and outer lives are one and 
the same. When she laughs, the reader does not expect any explanation as to why she is 
laughing, besides that she “felt happy,” or “was unable to control her joy which expressed 
itself by laughter.”  Natasha is often described as being out of “control”;  she even says to 97
Sonya, her cousin, while she prepares to elope with Anatole Kuragin: “I told you, I have no 
will. . .why don’t you understand?”  This lack of “free will” could appear merely as an 98
example of Tolstoy’s misogynistic understanding of the feminine character. But it could have 
another meaning understood as an “epic” quality within Natasha. 
 Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly in their sensational book All Things Shining describe 
the difficulty of a modern reading into the motivations of Homeric characters. A 
contemporary reader understands motivation through “inner experiences and beliefs.”  The 99
figure who most lives through “inner experience” is Andrei: the most contemporary and 
secularly turning  character in the book. I have also argued that he is the most absolute and 
monistic. Pierre to some extent also lives in this way, although he has the capacity to 
understand and thrive in a world of multiplicity. Natasha, on the other hand, never lives 
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inwardly. Her moods are experienced as “public” and “shareable.”  This is the 100
characteristic Dreyfus and Kelly notice within the character of Homer’s epics. They write 
that: 
The Homeric Greeks were open to the world. . .instead of understanding themselves 
in terms of inner experiences and beliefs, they saw themselves as being swept up into 
public and shareable moods. . .moods are important because they illuminate a shared 
situation: they manifest what matters most in the moment and in doing so draw 
people to perform. . .passionate deeds.       101
This finds a resonance in Natasha, whose great strength exists in her ability to transfer her 
moods to other characters and “illuminate” possibly the greatest of all “shared situation[s]”: 
the beautiful “shining” quality of life.  Of course, the connection between Natasha and the 
Homeric character cannot be applied in every respect. Although Tolstoy “listed” the Iliad  
along side the “Odyssey among the ten books which had influenced him most,”  the 102
tradition behind him did not support polytheism, and, of course, “Homeric excellence bears 
little resemblance to modern moral agency.”  But it should also be remembered that 103
Tolstoy as a man could find no comfort through the tradition behind him. By the end of his 
life, after years of searching for answers in a world apparently meaningless, Tolstoy created 
his own brand of Christianity, and retreated to his country estate to become a kind of self-
confirmed “sage” for the rest of his life.   The conception of meaning in Homer’s epics 104
resided in the conception of “arete” or “excellence of life” which relied on “gratitude and 
wonder” that could not conceive of the modern “nihilistic existence”  that agonized 105
Tolstoy. Natasha lives in perpetual “wonder,” and because of this she is capable of finding 
meaning, for most of the book, only through her various moods. Although I am loath to 
appropriate this term, it might serve as a way into Natasha’s potential within the book. 
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Unlike Andrei, who most clearly descends into a “nihilistic existence”  and views the world 
only through "public" and "private" values, Natasha does not distinguish between these two 
systems.  Unlike Pierre, Natasha does not rely upon on a pluralistic understanding of the 
world. Instead, she is the most realized manifestation of unreason and feeling separated 
from private and public values as they have been seen in War and Peace this far. She therefore 
yields the most unifying  synthesis of the finest most “shining” aspects within both Pierre 
and Andrei. I argue that to live like Natasha would be—especially for Tolstoy himself—a 
possible solution in the search for a meaningful life.
When she first appears in War and Peace as a young child, this is made evident. 
Natasha momentarily casts a spell on those around her, not through her actions precisely, 
but because she possesses an inexplicable freshness that transcends explanation. 
"Do you see?. . .My doll. . .Mimi. . .You see. . ." was all Natasha managed to utter
 (to her everything seemed funny). She leaned against her mother and burst into
 such a loud, ringing fit of laughter that even the prim visitor could not help joining in.106
This is the earliest example of Natasha’s inexplicable and infectious charm. She is perhaps 
the only character throughout the book who possess the power to share her moods with all 
those near her. Both of my previous chapters are connected through the turning experiences 
which Natasha effects. Pierre’s revery at the comet of 1812 is directly the result of his 
moment with Natasha, the change in Count Rostov’s mood occurs as he listens to his sister 
sing; all that keeps Prince Andrei’s hope alive rests on the “divine love” which Natasha 
affects in him. These moments are always uniquely unreasoning and surprising. They offer 
no answer or insight but rely only on the intensity of feeling itself which Natasha is somehow 
able to tap into.  She is “open to the world,” and the world is consequently always open for 
 53
her.  In the constellations of War and Peace, Natasha shines brightest of all. It is difficult to 
track her “turns” because she is always turning. This, I suggest, allows Natasha a unique 
position within the book. Because her actions offer no explanation, her character is most 
sacrosanct. 
II
                    A New Case for the Absolute and Subjective Experience
Tolstoy describes his condition during his “search for answers to the meaning of life” in 
Confessions: “exactly as a man who is lost in a forest,” who, after scouring the darkness all 
night, came to the realization that: “there was no house and that there could be no house”  107
which might offer him shelter. This sort of terror relies on the supposition that to find peace 
one must first stop being “lost.” But, I suggest, that although Tolstoy could not completely 
face the possibility that: “there was no house,” and no place which might offer him shelter 
from the immensity of this dark and endless wood, the prospect of being “lost” does not 
have to necessitate fear or hopelessness. Natasha lives her entire life without looking for 
“answers to the meaning of life”; for her there is no “desire to possess something beyond the 
world,”  to quote a wonderful line from Mark Strand. This is interesting when one looks at 108
Natasha from the perspective of the “absolute.” Because Natasha lives completely  in the 
present moment, the possibility of completion or singularity presents a strange dilemma. 
Morson writes that Natasha, and the entire Rostov family: 
continually repeat, and act upon, the phrase ‘everything is possible.’ Trying to live 
without past, future, or other constraints, they each develop their own ways of 
dealing with a world in which very little is possible and choice is continually 
necessary.109
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Morson does not dwell on Natasha’s character for very long, besides making the comment 
that when Natasha is forced to make a decision which may have serious “consequences” she 
learns better than to live as if “everything is possible.” Morson does note the immediacy of 
the present in the Rostovs' character, but by the end of his mediation on Natasha the 
takeaway appears to be that everything is not possible, and the Rostovs must learn to live 
with it. But Morson seems to forget the way in which Natasha lives in the world: through 
the vacillations of her moods. More than this, Natasha’s belief that: “everything is possible” 
does not necessarily hold up in the literal sense. In the potential “shareable mood” which 
infects all those close to her, the necessity for making “choices” is not a rational one. The 
only possibly “absolute” in Natasha’s character is revealed as her “absolute” power to live 
only through her experiences. 
Even this reading of an “absolute” in Natasha deals more in a subjective use of the 
term, if such a thing is possible. Pierre embodies perhaps the most open-ended reading of 
“absolute” within the book, Natasha works a bit differently. Because she lives most 
completely through her moods, without tormenting herself “searching for answers” she does 
not face the necessity of strictly defining what is absolute and what is not within her world. 
A reading of Natasha’s “absolute” qualities differs from the previous readings of 
the“absolute” within Pierre and Andrei. Her experiences appear as “absolutes” to her; she 
does not conceive of decision or choice within them, but simply acts as she feels. Because of 
this, these experiences are always subjective and flexible, limited to the mood which 
temporarily takes her. This corresponds to Warne’s comment, that: “the essence of 
Tolstoyan visions seems to be the revisions. The man cannot make up his mind.”  The 110
“revisions” within Natasha do not yield to a finished product, so to speak, but constantly 
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change. The trajectory of her character, which Laura Olson called a “story of 
metamorphosis,” adheres to “various roles,”  but must be understood through transience in 111
mood. 
War and Peace  deals almost exclusively in the real, human events of this world, 
without any foray into the unearthly or supernatural. The dream sequences of Pierre and 
Andrei are understood only though their individual experiences, and do not effect the 
external world of the book. But Natasha’s imagination extends beyond herself. She enters 
reveries which serve as  “a spontaneous source of aesthetic power”  for those around her. 112
Often Natasha’s own moods affect others nearby, but sometimes the agency is reversed, and 
Natasha’s presence becomes the catalyst for experiences of “fullness” limited, or isolated in 
other characters, as when Andrei sees her looking at the moon.  She is the most sacred or 
“shining” of all characters because of this particular quality. 
         III
         Complications in Tolstoy’s. Language; Dissolving of Absolutes through Natasha
The possible issue in Natasha to address the complications which arise from understanding 
her as an embodiment of the sacrosanct, and a potentially “shining” manifestation of godly 
proportions in Tolstoy’s fictional world. Tolstoy presented what seems a very clear definition 
of “beauty” in his book What is Art?  The book came later in his life, so there is no direct 
influence in this definition and Natasha at all.  But reading the two identifications of 
“beauty” which he offers here,  evidences a direct relation between “absolute” and limited—
the two terms which most closely interest me. Morson writes that Tolstoy created “War and 
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Peace as a challenge to all traditional novels,” and that What is Art was his attempted 
“challenge to all traditional aesthetics.”  Morson’s comment is helpful in this allusion; while 113
written during very different periods of his life, the same modes in War and Peace are present 
in What is Art? His aim was to challenge. And in the two definitions of “beauty,” there is a 
critical divide which is helpful for us.  He writes that: 
there exist (and it could not be otherwise) only two definitions of beauty: one the 
objective and mystical one, which merges [a] conception with the highest perfection, with 
God—a fantastic definition, not based on anything; the other, on the contrary, a very simple 
and pleasing one (I do not add ‘without aim or advantage,’ because the word pleasing of 
itself implies this absence of any consideration or advantage). On the one hand, beauty is 
understood as something indefinite and, therefore, inconclusive of philosophy, religion, and 
life itself. . .or, on the other hand.. . .beauty is only a particular kind of disinterested pleasure 
which that we receive.114
Tolstoy’s penchant for “absolute language” is shockingly evident here. Clearly, the latter 
definition of “subjective” beauty is lesser in Tolstoy’s mind. His affinity of the first definition 
of “objective” and perfected beauty can be closely identified in those statements which has 
been noticed by Morson in all his writing, which are “expressed in absolute and 
uncompromising language.”  The project of my paper has been in dealing with moments 115
which appear “uncompromising,” and the events which seem to occur with absolute 
consequences, and attempted to find the potential faultiness of absolutes within experience 
throughout War and Peace. Of course, when Tolstoy writes things like “it could not be 
otherwise,” the reader immediately challenges the seemingly universal claim. This can be 
applied easily to the contents of War and Peace. Andrei’s single-mindedness kills him, Pierre 
lives best understanding that it always can be “otherwise.” So when Tolstoy writes passages 
like this one, which express universal claims of human existence, we are immediately 
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suspicious. Natasha is situated precariously in this two-fold definition of “beauty.” She does 
not embody either the “objective” form, which can only be understood through “highest 
perfection”; neither is she this definition of “subjective” beauty which only serves 
“disinterested pleasure.” Perhaps Natasha does not embody “beauty” at all, then. But 
Natasha’s ability to incite experiences presents another definition of “beauty” which Tolstoy 
does not account for in this late, challenging definition. This is not the beauty of higher 
power or simple “pleasure.” Instead, Natasha’s capacity for experiencing life without 
identifying what is beautiful in moral terms allows her to transcend the “public” and 
“private” values of most other principal characters in War and Peace. She is monistically 
inclined, and does not hold secretly “inner beliefs,” and she does not precisely fit into the 
category of pluralism which I identified in Pierre. This may be because, what is usually 
private is for Natasha—unconsciously—placed into the public sphere. She does not 
understand the various public systems as Andrei does; she is unconscious of their presence 
and—also unconsciously—dismantles them. Everyone can feel this, but she cannot be 
placed into Tolstoy’s first category of “beauty.” A new category must be made for Natasha, 
which dissolves private values  and public systems, and reveals that the living experience can 
be one without explanation, but nonetheless can be transcendent, brimming with “fullness” 
but divorced from higher power. Trying to avoid appropriating a Homeric “excellence in life” 
to fit the atmosphere of Tolstoy’s world, I suggest that a potentially different understanding 
of meaning which rests in perpetual “wonder” might be seen through Natasha. 
Although, as I noted previously, no supernatural events take place in War and Peace, a 
magical quality in the ordinary events of human life is often revealed through Natasha. 
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When her brother, the young Count Rostov, returns home on leave during his time in battle, 
his moments with Natasha draw him into states of wonder. For example, this scene: 
“You know Sonya’s my dearest friend. Such a friend that I burned my arm for her 
sake. Look here!” . . .
Sitting on the sofa with the little cushions on its arms, in what used to be his old 
schoolroom, and looking into Natasha's wildly bright eyes, Rostov reentered that 
world of home and childhood which had no meaning for anyone else, but gave him 
some of the best joys of his life; and the burning of an arm with a ruler as proof of 
love did not seem to him senseless, he understood and was not surprised at it. . .
"We are such friends, such friends! All that ruler business was just nonsense, 
but we are friends forever. She, if she loves anyone, she does it for life, but I don't 
understand that, I forget quickly."116
A number of insights into Natasha emerge in this simple, domestic interaction. Natasha’s 
presence brings Rostov back to the space of his home, her “bright eyes” allow the young 
Count to “reente[r]” a space which, although it “has no meaning for anyone else,” is deeply 
meaningful to him. Although no great turn is affected in Rostov or Natasha during the brief 
scene, Natasha’s power to invite and welcome-in memory and imagination is apparent. She 
understands that the “ruler business is all nonsense”; there is even a hint that Natasha 
recognizes the foolishness of  burning her arm. But what she does, she does without regret. 
She “forget[s] quickly,” and does not feel the need to explain herself further.  
Simply “looking into Natasha’s wildly bright eyes” allows Rostov entrance into the 
hidden world of personal memory and “joys.” This particular power within Natasha is 
evident in many other scenes throughout the book, and it  does not only affect those whom 
Natasha is personally close to. Even the nameless “connoisseurs,” lose themselves when 
Natasha sings; she effectively does away with, or at least makes level, all systematized roles 
for the luminous moments which she takes control of a space: 
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[Natasha] did not yet sing well, as all the connoisseurs who had her said: "it is not 
trained, but it is a beautiful voice that must be trained." Only they generally said this 
some time after she had finished singing. While that untrained voice, with its 
incorrect breathing and labored transitions, was sounding, even the connoisseurs said 
nothing, but only delighted and wished to hear it again.117
Natasha’s “incorrect” and “labored transitions” are specifically important in this passage. If 
she were the embodiment of the “highest perfection,” the effect would be lost; the most 
significant and moving aspect of Natasha is her capacity to feel and experience without ever 
attaining “objective” or singular perfection. The space for speculation can only occur “some 
time after”: during the moment of her performance Natasha captivates and levels all 
judgement. She is completely of her world, yet she transcends explanation. The ordinary is 
therefore extraordinary when it can feel and experience without looking for meaning. 
IV
 Luminosity, Reveal and the Potentials of Imagination  
 When Pierre disguises himself in a coachman’s cloak, and wanders the streets of Moscow, 
Natasha immediately recognizes his true identity. Her mother, the Countess Rostova, does 
not believe her daughter, exclaiming: “how could you talk such nonsense!”  Natasha’s 118
ability to recognize and reveal that which desires to be disguised—here Pierre—proves 
critical for her. When Pierre’s identity is revealed, he feels Natasha’s  “radiant, happy 
expression—of which he was conscious without looking at her” and which “filled him with 
enchantment.”  When Natasha reveals to the reader some quality which was previously 119
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hidden—in this case, the true identity of Pierre—the response is almost always one of 
“enchantment,” not, say, worry or contempt at being discovered. 
This is one, literal example of Natasha’s capacity to incite and “reveal” wonder. In 
many instances Natasha’s power of recognition is far less literally realized. But consistently 
throughout the book, Natasha serves as a way into an otherwise inaccessible potential for 
revelation. While Natasha recognizes that which is hidden, her other great strength lives in 
her imagination, which allows her to revise and route that which would otherwise be 
considered impossible. This allows Natasha to live through potentiality, to live as if nothing 
is impossible. Because of her potential to reveal what one might call the magic quality of 
ordinary life, everyone is attracted to her. Those who come into contact with her recognize 
themselves, or some part of a common existence which appears both public and private, 
universal and particular, absolute but also, importantly, deeply limited. 
When Natasha arrives at her debut ball, she “looked in the mirrors and could not 
distinguish her reflection from the others. All was blended in one brilliant procession.”   120
Natasha’s “blended” identity is described only viscerally, through “reflection” not in terms of 
her internal, but external appearance. Because there is little distinction in Natasha’s inner 
and outer life, becoming “one” in a “brilliant procession,” does not have the same 
implications as was previously noticed in Pierre. But this is not precisely to say that Natasha 
does not tend towards pluralism, just that she does so in a different way.  The dissolving of 
what seems-to-be and what really is, which we see in Natasha the most complete 
representation of one who asks no “fundamental questions.”  This is only possible because 121
she accepts unconsciously that “brilliant procession” which makes up everything. It is 
because of her that Pierre fully believes that  “everything…  was worthy of being loved.”122
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When he Natasha’s “shareable mood” most intensely, Pierre stops asking himself: 
That terrible question “Why?” “Wherefore?” which had come to him amid every
 occupation was now replaced, not by another question or a reply to the former 
question, but by her image  123
Although there is a potential reading of Natasha’s “image” as sort of symbolic icon, which 
holds implication with a Russian Orthodox tradition, the emphasis on “her image” shifts 
focus to Natasha precisely. Perhaps Natasha’s finest quality— that which makes her most 
“shining” and godly—is her ability to reveal the transcendent in the world, not through 
“inner experience,” and not in terms of artificial public values but in the ordinary world. 
Morson prefaces his reading of “absolute language” in Tolstoy as “an attempt to answer the 
riddles of existence by denying the existence of meaningful riddles,” going on to say that “for 
Tolstoy, a true understanding of life is achieved not when fundamental questions are 
answered, but when there is no need to ask them.”  Natasha’s ability to live a life which is 124
“hidden in plain view,” not through private experience but through its opposite, allows her 
to live perhaps the most realized manifestation of Morson’s idea. Through Natasha, those 
“questions” transform, in many cases, into wonder and joy, and the potentials of living in 
some form of peace without an answer at all. The “vanity of all earthly things” is thrown into 
relief by Natasha’s exuberance. She is instilled with “earthly” beauty, and this opens up a new 
possible meaning for those who she touches. This power is vested in her ability to live 
without doubt, through feeling, the unintellectual senses; this quality manifests in those 
around her as love, “divine” love which is too much for Andrei, and which raises Pierre from 
asking that “terrible question.”
Natasha is seen at the conclusion of the book completely transformed. She has 
“abandoned her witchery”  and adopted the messy life a mother. The narration chalks up 125
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Natasha’s “witchery” to a “powerfully seductive” quality within her; this is contestable. The 
love which Andrei felt for Natasha was already described as a “divine” one. Pierre finds 
peace in this and “love” for “everyone” through Natasha’s influence. Instead of writing off 
this element within her as merely seduction, sensuality, or  feminine wile, I would suggest 
that this final portrayal of Natasha works as a disguised form of “absolute language.” 
Natasha’s ability to remove disguise, and reveal the possibility of meaning in a world filled 
with unanswerable questions of “wherefore” and “why” does reveal her, in some sense at least, 
as one who possess magical qualities. One might look at her conclusion as an attempt of to 
take away this power in Natasha, enacted by the authorial “absolute.” This sudden shift does 
not, however, take away the “wonder” which, throughout almost the entire book, maintains 
a powerful influence. 
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     Conclusion 
          —Considering Further Limitations—
The subject of this paper offers, I see now, also its greatest ending. I was concerned 
principally with limitations, and I feel strongly my own limitations as I conclude my study. 
There is so much which I might have offered, and so much which seems lacking, and which, 
for one reason or another, to use Tolstoy’s own words “I could not” and did not  “enlarge 
on.” The subject which I wanted to address has, I hope, not been totally lost: the 
impossibility of reading Tolstoy’s “absolute language” as completely absolute, and the 
significance of subjectivity and flexibility, the possibility of finding immanence in the 
knowable world, etc.  But still it seems that a vast area of this study did not amount to all 
that it could have.  
 Berlin’s two representations of Tolstoy as “fox” and “hedgehog” go some distance 
towards illustrating a few aspects of Pierre and Andrei. In Andrei, I attempted to reveal the 
potential failures in a monistic system, especially in light of a rising, secular nihilism; this 
made him a kind of “hedgehog.” Pierre’s flexibility in understanding a “variety of 
experiences” allows him to move between many different beliefs, maintaining a meaningful 
and rich existence; I imply that he is more of a “fox.”  Yet I am afraid that the two terms 
which I use throughout are not quite adequate. There is another reading in the “limits” of 
“absolute language” which I did not expand on in the paper, and which would have yielded 
perhaps a far more rich final product. This is the possible unification which relies and thrives 
on an understanding of pluralism. Andrei’s monism fails only because of his selfishness—not 
intrinsically in the monistic traits which I read in him. I tried to ignore, or took some 
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liberty with, the potential complications that this dualistically inclined reading might give 
rise too. Here, I might look to a few of these issues. 
Inviting though it was to view Berlin’s construction of the “fox” and the “hedgehog” 
from two different angles—one favoring multiplicity, the other singularity, i.e. the “limited” 
versus the “absolute,” they may not in fact exist in the opposition which, in this paper at 
least, they appear. I might even argue that the only real “universal system” would join rather 
than split the two descriptions. Pierre finds peace once he views himself amid the “countless 
other scintillating stars”; this should not, though, fix him rigidly into one construction—
pluralistic, in my reading— at all. John Ashbery’s line from “A Blessing in Disguise” captures 
a potentially alternate reading which allows for multiplicity within the “universal”:  “I prefer 
“you” in the plural,/I want “you”. . .all golden and pale/Like the dew and the air. /And then I 
start getting this feeling of exaltation.”  In a reading which places plural opposite to 126
singular, of course, perhaps these sorts of paradoxical thoughts come prerequisite.  
The other possible reading which I was not able to think through concerned the 
tone in which Tolstoy actually conveys statements of “absolute language,” or universal 
truths. The frequency of these statements, and their at times bewildering and absurd 
placement lead to the comment from a friend recently—something along the lines of, was he 
serious? Another way of framing this would be: is there a caveat in Tolstoy’s use of the 
“absolute” which escaped Morson? Could Tolstoy not really mean these obviously universal 
statements? or was he, perhaps, being a bit tongue-and-cheek, when he says things like “all 
happy families are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way,” a statement 
which Anna Karenina inevitably disproves.   This, of course, one can never know.  
Nevertheless, the “luminosity” which I characterized in Natasha evidenced another 
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dimension, which might not concede so definitively in relation to the other two. The two 
poems I included in the preface, in reflection, might suggest a journey which has no real end 
at all; one which, as I see it, is of the most extreme significance not only in this study, but in 
the study of human life in all its “innumerable, inexhaustible manifestations.”   
 Ashbery, John, Collected Poems,  “A Blessing in Disguise.” 126
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